Релятивизм и толерантность

Релятивизм часто связывают с нормативной позицией относительно того, как люди должны относиться или вести себя по отношению к тем, с кем у них есть этические разногласия. Самая выдающаяся нормативная позиция, которая известна в этой связи – это толерантность. В последние годы идея толерантности распространялась все больше. В то же время, против нее выдвигались и возражения, пошатнувшие философское обоснование идеи толерантности. Вопрос: может ли этический релятивизм внести какой-либо вклад в это обсуждение?

. The question here is whether moral relativism has something to contribute to these discussions, in particular, whether DMR or MMR provide support for tolerance.

In this context, tolerance does not ordinarily mean indifference or absence of disapproval:

 

It means having a policy of not interfering with the actions of persons that are based on moral judgments we reject, when the disagreement is not or cannot be rationally resolved. The context of discussion is often, but not always, moral disagreements between two societies. Does moral relativism give us a reason to be tolerant in this sense?

Though many people seem to think it does, philosophers generally think they are mistaken.

DMR may provide the occasion for tolerance, but it could not imply that tolerance is morally obligatory or even permissible.

 

DMR simply tells us there are moral disagreements. Recognition of this fact, by itself, entails nothing about how we should act towards those with whom we disagree.

MMR fares no better. For one thing, MMR cannot very well imply that it is an objective moral truth that we should be tolerant: MMR denies that there are such truths.

(A mixed position could contend that tolerance is the only objective moral truth, all others being relative; but it would have to be shown that this is more than an ad hoc maneuver.)

It might be said that MMR implies that tolerance is a relative truth. However, even this is problematic. According to MMR, understood to concern truth, the truth-value of statements may vary from society to society. Hence, the statement, “people ought to be tolerant” (T), may be true in some societies and false in others. MMR by itself does not entail that T is true in any society, and may in fact have the result that T is false in some societies (a similar point may be made with respect to justification).

Some objectivists may add that in some cases we should be tolerant of those with whom we morally disagree, but that only objectivists can establish this as an objective moral truth (for example, by drawing on arguments in the liberal tradition from Locke or Mill).

 

To the objection that moral objectivism implies intolerance (or imperialism), objectivists typically contend that the fact that we regard a society as morally wrong in some respect does not entail that we should interfere with it.

Nonetheless, the thought persists among some relativists that there is a philosophically significant connection between relativism and tolerance.

Perhaps the conjunction of MMR and an ethical principle could give us a reason for tolerance we would not have on the basis of the ethical principle alone. Such an approach has been proposed by Wong (1984: ch. 12). The principle is, roughly speaking, that we should not interfere with people unless we could justify this interference to them (if they were rational and well-informed in relevant respects).

Wong called this “the justification principle.”

Of course, it is already a tolerance principle of sorts. The idea is that it gains broader scope if MMR is correct.

Let us suppose the statement that there is an individual right to freedom of speech is true and justified for our society, but is false and unjustified in another society in which the press is restricted for the good of the community. In this case, given MMR, our society might not be able to justify interference to the restrictive society concerning freedom of the press. Any justification we could give would appeal to values that are authoritative for us, not them, and no appeal to logic or facts alone would give them a reason to accept our justification.

If the justification principle were widely accepted, this argument might explain why some people have had good reason to think there is a connection between relativism and tolerance. But there is a question about whether the position is stab le.

Wong derived the justification principle from Kant, and Kant rejected MMR. If we were to accept MMR, would we still have reason to accept the justification principle? Wong thought we might, perhaps on the basis of considerations quite independent of Kant. In any case, this argument would only show that MMR plays a role in an argument for tolerance that is relevant to people in a society that accepted the justification principle. The argument does not establish that there is a general connection between relativism and tolerance. Nor does it undermine the contention that MMR may have the result that T is true in some societies and false in others.

In his more recent defense of pluralistic relativism (2006), Wong has argued that, since some serious moral disagreements are inevitable, any adequate morality will include the value of what he calls accommodation. This involves a commitment to peaceful and non-coercive relationships with persons with whom we disagree. Accommodation appears to be related to tolerance, but Wong argues for more than this: we should also try to learn from others, compromise with them, preserve relationships with them, etc. Wong's defense of accommodation is immune to the objection that relativism cannot be a basis for such a universal value because his defense purports to be based on considerations that any adequate morality should recognize. However, for this reason, though it presupposes the considerations supporting the relativist dimension of his position (there is no single true morality), it argues from the non-relativist dimension (there are universal constraints any morality should accept, in particular, that one function of morality is to promote social co-operation). Hence, it is not strictly speaking an argument from relativism to accommodation.