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Äàòà äîáàâëåíèÿ: 2015-10-15; ïðîñìîòðîâ: 616



Defending multiculturalism but warning against its excesses

Multiculturalism has many positive benefits. It defends the right to the different, which is a very important and precious human right, especially for those people whose difference has historically resulted in social marginalization and exclusion: including women, black, disabled and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people.

The multicultural ethos first blossomed in the 1970s, and took off in the 1980s. It was a breath of fresh air after the stifling, boring and often repressive monoculturalism of most western societies in the 1950s.

Half a century later we can now see that the multicultural ethos can also have its downside. The way it is sometimes interpreted is divisive and oppressive. In particular, it can lead to a shameful betrayal of women's rights, here and abroad, in the name of respecting “ethnic diversity” and “cultural difference.”

Despite the extreme oppression of tens of millions of women in many parts of the Middle East, most of multiculturalism’s left-wing promoters rarely protest against female genital mutilation, forced marriages, execution by stoning, compulsory veiling and the pervasive system of gender apartheid. Why the silence?

Sure, women are not equal in Britain or the US, but the inequalities faced today by women in the West pale into insignificance compared to the barbaric crimes against female humanity in parts of the Arab and Muslim world.

Here in the UK, a perverse interpretation of multiculturalism has resulted in race and religion ruling the roost in a tainted hierarchy of oppression. In the name of “unity” against Islamophobia and racism, much of the left tolerates misogyny and homophobia in minority communities. It rejects common standards of rights and responsibilities; demanding that we “make allowances” and “show sensitivity” with regard to the prejudices of some people in ethnic and faith communities. This attitude is patronizing, even racist. It judges minority peoples by different standards.

This moral (or immoral) hierarchy has shaped public policy on discrimination. Legislation against racism is much tougher than legislation against homophobia. Racial slurs provoke far stronger public condemnation than sexist ones.

It is curious to note how some liberals and left-wingers mute their condemnation of intolerance when it emanates from non-white people; whereas they would strenuously denounce similar prejudice if it was being vented by whites against blacks or by Christians against Muslims. They argue that we have to “understand” bigots from racial and religious minorities; yet few of them ever urge the same “understanding” of white working class bigots.

Some multiculturalists argue that western Christianization and colonialism are responsible for prejudice in minority communities. The hate-mongers in these communities are deemed more or less blameless. They are victims, not perpetrators, according to this guilt-ridden “anti-racism.” Such nonsense infantilizes non-white people, treating them as inferiors who are deemed incapable of taking responsibility for their actions and of behaving morally. Besides, it is absurd to excuse today’s ethnic bigots on the basis of the victimization of their forebears two centuries ago in the days of empire.

Double standards on human rights influence law enforcement, even in the UK. Jamaican dance hall singers are free to incite the murder of “b*tty boys” (faggots) without fear of prosecution. No gay person could get away with urging the killing of “n*ggers.” Likewise, fundamentalist Muslim clerics are tolerated when they endorse the so-called “honor” killing of unchaste women; whereas any woman who dared advocate violent retribution against Islamist misogynists would soon find herself arrested and in court.

We have long experienced the hypocrisy of the political right. In the name of defending “freedom,” many conservatives defended the very unfree regimes of Franco’s Spain, and Pinochet’s Chile. Alarmingly, this selective approach to human rights is now echoed by sections of the left, with their lack of protests against the murderous regimes in Iran, Zimbabwe and Sudan.

President Mugabe has massacred more black Africans than P.W. Botha in apartheid South Africa. In contrast to the global anti-apartheid movement, there have been no worldwide protests to support the Zimbabwean struggle for democracy and human rights. Why does a black tyrant murdering black people merit less outrage than a white tyrant murdering black people?

These double standards have many downsides. Respect for diversity and the patronization of minority communities have sometimes degenerated into open support for human rights opponents.

The leaders of the UK’s left-wing campaign group, Unite Against Fascism (UAF), embraced the right-wing Muslim leader, Sir Iqbal Sacranie, after he denounced gays as immoral, harmful and diseased. They said it was important to unite with homophobic Muslims for the sake of the “more important” battle against the far right British National Party; implying that the struggle against homophobia was not really very important at all. In other words, in this leftist hierarchy of worthy causes, religious fundamentalism trumps gay human rights. = ‘gay human rights’ : problème: un communautariste qui dénonce d’autres communautaristes

Sadly, as this example illustrates, the multicultural ethos has sometimes become a Trojan horse for the subversion of human rights and for the promotion of bizarre double standards.

We all know that a gay leader who was prejudiced against Muslims would not be invited to address a UAF conference. He’d be denounced and declared a pariah. Yet UAF happily invited the anti-gay bigot Sacranie to speak at its conference as an honored guest. Hypocrisy or what?

By asserting and celebrating difference, multiculturalism can divide people, often on racial and religious lines. We have sadly witnessed conflicts between some factions of Afro-Caribbean and Asian youth, and tensions between sections of the Muslim, Hindu and Jewish communities.

This shows that too much focus on difference can spill over into separateness, which subverts an appreciation of our common humanity and undermines notions of universal rights and equal citizenship. It can produce a new form of splintering and factionalism, where societies are fragmented into myriad communities, each loyal primarily to itself and with less interest in the common good of society as a whole.

The anti-racist struggle, for example, has been weakened by the excesses of the “diversity agenda.” In the 1960s and 1970s, all non-whites united together as “black people” to fight their common oppression: racism. Then black divided into Afro-Caribbean, African and Asian. More recently, part of the Asian community has split off to identify primarily as Muslim, distancing themselves from other Asians, such as Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and atheists.

This fragmentation has been endorsed by some on the left, who have colluded with communalism and the division of the Asian community on religious lines. These left-wingers have a great deal to say about the oppression of Muslims but little or nothing to say about the racism and disadvantage experienced by Asians of other faiths and Asians of no faith at all.

Multiculturalism can thus sometimes foster a “Balkanization” of the humanitarian agenda, fracturing communities according to their different cultural identities, values and traditions. When these differences are prioritized, our common interests get sidelined. Racial and religious particularities dominate. This can promote social division and antagonism.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to dump multiculturalism because of its sometimes regressive interpretation. Just because some sections of liberal and left opinion seem to have gone soft on their commitment to universal human rights, and lapsed into a dodgy “cultural relativism,” this is no reason to reject the multicultural ethos per se.

Progressive multiculturalism is worth defending. It involves respecting and celebrating difference, but within a framework of equality and human rights. It is premised on embracing cultural diversity, providing it does not involve the oppression of other people. Human rights are universal and indivisible.

Peter Tatchell is a human rights campaigner: www.petertatchell.net

You can follow Peter on Twitter at http://twitter.com/PeterTatchell or

 

 

 


Lecture 5 31 March 2011 - ‘Towards the death of British multiculturalism and the renewal of shared values? (2001-2011)


New diversity governance measures since 2001 (riots in North & Midlands + 9/11) emphasising shared values

- ‘Community cohesion’ and putting an end to ‘parallel lives’: Ouseley & Cantle Reports etc.
- Integration rehabilitated
- New measures / policies: citizenship education; Britishness tests; citizenship ceremonies etc.
-
Yet this trend: accompanied by a rather paranoid vision of diversity:

Liberticidal measures
- PREVENT strategy
- 42 day detention without charges for terrorism suspects
- etc.
- examine new provisions under the Freedom Bill (?)

 

The dark side of cohesion policies

Security had been on New Labour’s agenda even before the interethnic riots in the North and the Midlands and 9/11, as shown e.g. in the passing of the Terrorism Act (2000), which had already extended and toughened the anti-terror measures adopted under John Major.[30] Unsurprisingly, security measures were emphasised after 7/7 In November 2008, as part of the anti-terror legislation, the government had to shelve its controversial and liberticidal plan to up the custody period without charge for suspects of terrorism from 28 to 42 days, due to parliamentary opposition in both Chambers, including among Labour MPs (Counter-Terrorism Act 2008).

Security became one aspect of ‘cohesion’ policies, as shown in setting up of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion and the subsequent launch of the so-called Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) programme, also known as ‘Prevent’(April 2007). The Department for Communities and Local Government presented its key approaches as ‘promoting shared values, supporting local solutions, building civic capacity and leadership, and strengthening the role of faith institutions and leaders.’[31]By 2008, following recommendations made by the Commission, the central Government created two public service agreements, namely PSA21 and PSA26.

On the one hand, PSA 21 is in keeping with the core ideas behind ‘cohesion’, i.e. ‘to build cohesive, empowered and active communities.’ Three national indicators assess the efficiency of PSA21, notably by evaluating the relationship of different groups living in a given community (NI1), the sense of belonging of people living in a local community (NI2) and residents’ perception of whether they can influence decisions in their locality (NI3).

The objective of PSA26, on the other hand, is to reduce risks related to international terrorism in the UK and in UK overseas interests, three national indicators measuring the efficiency of the Public Service Agreement:

• NI35-building resilience[32] to violent extremism


• NI36-protection against terrorist attack (crowded places)


• NI37- public awareness of civil contingency measures[33]

PVE in general and PSA 26 in particular became controversial among local Muslim communities, as they soon realised they were targeted or indeed stigmatised by the programme, especially after the government identified a certain number of markers to tell ‘good’ Muslims from ‘bad’ ones. Thus Muslims would be considered ‘extremist’ if advocating non-participation in UK elections, calling for the creation of a caliphate, promoting Sharia or rejecting homosexuality.[34] The divisiveness of the programme was underlined from the outset, as it soon became clear that Muslim community organisations willing to co-operate would receive subsidies. Many Muslim groups, notably in the North refused to co-operate, and many of those that did co-operate did it undercover, as they were accused of literally spying on supposedly less ‘docile’ groups or individuals. Another major bone of contention stemmed from the fact that the impact of British foreign policy options in Iraq and Afghanistan on the radicalisation of certain British Muslims was ignored by the programme.[35]

 

 


Community cohesion as a new form of multiculturalism

- Differentialist habits: ingrained
- Muslim Council of Britain demand: prayer spaces in State schools, sometimes separate rooms for boys and girls: accepted by many schools in ethnically diverse areas.
- Ramadan Fast in schools : calls to prayer in schools through loudspeakers (since Ramadan 2008 in Bristol e.g.)
- Arbitral tribunal (both Muslim and Jewish) + Sharia Councils running parallel with the British court system
- Archbishop of Canterbury’s remark that application of sharia in UK: inevitable.
- Radical Muslim organisations banned in the entire Muslim world but allowed in Britain
- Balkanised vision of British society: continued, as shown in new ethnic subcategories introduced in 2011 census
-

 

 

 


[1] Jean-Paul Révauger « Les politiques publiques britanniques à l’égard de l’islam », Laïcité : enjeux et pratiques, sous la direction de Pierre Singaravélou, Bordeaux : Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux-Montaigne Humanités, 2008. p. 217-231

[2] “Injuring or defiling place of worship, with intent to insult the religion of any class.-- Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of worship, or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” http://indiankanoon.org/doc/305995/ (retrieved on 1st June, 2009)

[3] James F. Hollifield, L’immigration et l’Etat-Nation : A la recherche d’un modèle national, Paris : L’Harmattan, 1997, p. 8.

[4] Anthony Eden (1955-1957).

[5] Quoted in Catherine Puzzo’s unpublished Ph.D thesis, « Immigration Controls in Britain and France (1970-1986) : A Comparative Study of Policy », School of Language and International Studies, University of Surrey, March 2010, p. 87.

 

[6] Emmanuel Todd, Le Destin des Immigrés, Paris, Le Seuil, 1993.

 

[7] A report on the Rivers of Blood speech (with excerpts of the address) may be viewed on : http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HP7fETsKYkA (retrieved on 17 Nov. 09)

[8] A white paper (or "whitepaper") is an authoritative report or guide that is often oriented toward a particular issue or problem. White papers are used to educate readers and help people make decisions, and are often requested and used in politics, policy, business, and technical fields. Policy makers frequently request white papers from academics to inform policy developments with expert opinions or relevant research.

[9] Solomos, p.86.

[10] McCruden, 1983, p. 56 quoted in Solomos, p. 88.

[11] « […] people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture and, you know, the British character has done so much for democracy, for law and done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in. Margaret Thatcher,TV Interview for Granada World in Action, Friday 27 January 1978.

 

[12] Cf. Mrs Thatcher’s 'rather swamped’ statement in a TV Interview for Granada’s World in Action (27 January 1978).

[13] William K Kay, Leslie J Francis & Keith Watson, “Religion in education”, Education –Distance Learning N°4, Leominster: Gracewing Publishing, 2003, p. 17.

[14] The 1991 census was partly inspired by the 1990 US census, which featured four ethno-racial categories cf. Vincent Latour, « Entre hybrdité et univocité culturelles : les inner cities de Bristol », Cahiers du MIMMOC, novembre 2007.

[15] John Carvel,“Call to Reform Race Law”, The Guardian, 13 June 1991.

[16] John Carvel, “NHS anti-racism policies ‘failing’”, The Guardian, 13 June 1991.

[17] http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hors173.pdf

[18] Or indeed, arguably, since the passing of the 1976 Race Relations Act

[19] Mc Roy, p.2

[20] “Rushdie broke Islamic Pact”, The Guardian, 17 December 1991.

[21]Peter Murtagh, “Rushdie in hiding after Ayatollah's death threat”, The Guardian, Saturday February 18 1989

[22] Anthony Mc Roy, From Rushdie to 7/7 : The Radicalisation of Islam in Britain, London, the Social Affairs Unit, 2006, p. 233

[23] Kenan Malik, ‘The real value of diversity’ (2002) http://www.kenanmalik.com/essays/diversity.html

[24] John Rex, ‘Milticulturalist and political integration in Europe’, in Marco Martinello, Multiculturlalist Policies and the state: a comparison of two European Societies, ERCOMER: Utrech, 1998, pp 21-22.

[25] Floya Anthias & Niral Yuval-Davies, Racialised Boundaries: race, nation, gender, colour and class and the anti-racist struggle. London: Routledge, 1992, p. 182, quoted in Fomina, 418.

[26] Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, Beyond Multiculturalism, London : The Foreign Policy Centre, 2001.

[27] Brian Barry, Culture & Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, Harvard University Press, 2001, p. 269, cité dans Fomina, p. 417.

[28] Barry, p. 295.

 

[29] Later the government admitted its past naivety in thinking that the very fact of watching closely the Finsbury fundamentalists (as well as those attending a few other notorious mosques) would be enough to keep things under control. The shortcoming of that policy was that it rested on the assumption that Islamic fundamentalism was confined to a handful of places of worship, where potentially dangerous religious extremists were known to the police. The attacks of 7/7 came as a shock because they showed that most kamikazes were British, born and bred, and that none of them had been identified as dangerous by the police forces.

[30] Vincent Latour & Catherine Puzzo, « L’impact du 11 septembre au Royaume Uni: Déclencheur du durcissement des politiques d’immigration et d’intégration ou simple prétexte? » in Revue Babel N°21 - Le Royaume Uni dans la monde depuis 2001, sous la direction de Karine Tournier-Sol, Toulon : Presses Universitaires de Toulon-Var, 2010.

[31] Preventing violent extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds, London: Department for Communities and Local Government, April 2007, p.9 http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/320752.pdf

 

[32] The notion of ‘resilience’ to extremism is also to be found in cohesion policies put in place in Canada and Australia.

 

[33] Wirral City Council, “Community Cohesion”

http://www.wirral.gov.uk/my-services/community-and-living/equality-and-cohesion/equality-and-diversity/community-cohesion

[34] Majed Iqbal,‘Muslim Communities in the North Reject Government PVE Strategy’, August 20 2009, http://menmedia.co.uk/asiannews/news/s/1132575_muslim_communities_in_the_north_reject_government_pve_strategy

[35] Ibid.


[i] John Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain (2nd edition), (London, MacMillan, 1993) 84.

[vl1]NB : such exemptions exist in countries that are not multicultrualist (France) but not in some couintries where the official policy is multiculturalism (e.g. Sweden).

‘to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice: ‘practice’: very vague, especially for practising Muslims, for whom many daily activities are likely to be considered as ‘practice’ cf. Sikhs.

[vl2]Cf. Rowan Williams and ‘inevitable’ use of sharia law alongside British law. Already the case in the with Muslim Arbitration Tribunals and Sharia Courts, seen by some as a threat to Human Rights cf. Muslim Arbitration Tribunals in the UK. Cf. Cantle’s parallel lives (2004), except such practices: unchallenged in 2011.

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