Pluralism and Democracy

Most scholars today acknowledge that democratic societies are governed by elites But often they seek to reaffirm democratic values by contending:

1. That there iscompetition among elites;

2. That voters can influence elite behavior by choosing between competing
elites in elections;

3. That elites are not closed and new social groups can gain access to elite
positions;

4. That elites dominating various areas of society, such as business, government, education, defense, and the arts, have not formed a common alliance and do not dominate the society as a single elite.

In short, scholars generally believe that democratic values can be effectively realized through the plural elite model.

Pluralism, then, is the belief that democratic values can be preserved in a system of multiple, competing elites, in which voters can exercise meaningful choices in elections and in which new elites can gain access to power. But pluralism should not be considered synonymous with democracy; for pluralism does not include direct citizen participation in decision making. Pluralists recognize that mass participation in decision making is not possible in a complex, urban, industrial society and that decision making must be accomplished through elite interaction, rather than individual participation. However, the underlying value of individual dignity still motivates pluralism; for it is the hope of pluralists that countervailing centers of elite power – the competition between business elites, labor elites, and governmental elites – can check each other and can keep each interest from abusing its power or oppressing the individual.

Of course, decision making by elite interaction, whether it succeeds in protecting the individual or not, fails to contribute to individual growth and development. In this regard, modern pluralism diverges sharply from classic democracy, which emphasizes as a primary value the development that would result from the opportunity of the individual to participate actively in decisions that significantly affect his life.

Another central value of classical democratic politics is individual participation in decision making. In modern pluralism, however, individual participation has given way to interaction – bargaining, accommodation, and compromise – between leaders of institutions and organizations in society. Individuals are represented in the political system only insofar as they are members of institutions or organizations whose leaders participate in policy making. Government is held responsible not by individual citizens but by leaders of institutions, organized interest groups, and political parties. The principal actors are leaders of corporations and financial institutions, elected and appointed government officials, the top ranks of military and governmental bureaucracies, and leaders of large organizations in labor, agriculture, and the professions.

Pluralism stresses the fragmentation of power in society and the influence of public opinion and elections on the behavior of elites. But this fragmentation of power is not identical with the democratic ideal of political equality. Who rules in the pluralist view of America? According to political scientist Aaron Wildavsky, "different small groups of interested and active citizens in different issue areas with some overlap, if any, by public officials, and occasional intervention by a larger number of people at the polls." This is not government by the people. While citizen influence can be felt through leaders who anticipate the reaction of citizens, decision making is still in the hands of the leaders – the elites. According to the pluralists, multiple elites decide public policy in America, each in their own area of interest.

Traditional democratic theory envisions public policy as a rational choice of individuals with equal influence, who evaluate their needs and reach a decision with due regard for the rights of others. This traditional theory does not view public policy as a product of elite interaction or interest group pressures. In fact, interest groups and even political parties were viewed by classical democratic theorists as intruders into an individualistic brand of citizenship and politics.

There are several other problems in accepting pluralism as the legitimate heir to classical democratic theory. First of all, can pluralism assure that membership in organizations and institutions is really an effective form of individual participation in policy making? Robert Presthus argues that the organizations and institutions on which pluralists rely "become oligarchic and restrictive insofar as they monopolize access to government power and limit individual participation."

Henry Kariel writes, "The voluntary organizations or associations which the early theorists of pluralism relied upon to sustain the individual against a unified omnipotent government, have themselves become oligarchially governed hierarchies." The individual may provide the numerical base for organizations, but what influence does he have upon the leadership? Rarely do corporations, unions, armies, churches, government bureaucracies, or professional associations have any internal mechanisms of democracy. They are usually run by a small elite of officers and activists. Leaders of corporations, banks, labor unions, churches, universities, medical associations, and bar associations remain in control year after year. Only a small number of people attend meetings, vote in organizational elections, or make their influence felt within their organization. The pluralists offer no evidence that the giant organizations and institutions in American life really represent the views or interests of their individual members.

Also, can pluralism really assume that the dignity of the individual is being protected by elite competition? Since pluralism contends that different groups of leaders make decisions in different issue areas, why should we assume that these leaders compete with each other? It seems more likely that each group of leaders would consent to allow other groups of leaders to govern their own spheres of influence without interference. Accommodation, rather than competition, may be the prevailing style of elite interaction.

Pluralism answers with the hope that the power of diverse institutions and organisations in society will roughly balance out and that the emergence of power monopoly is unlikely. Pluralism (like its distantcousin, the economics of Adam Smith) assures us that no interests can ever emerge the complete victor in political competition. Yet inequality of power among institutions and organisations is commonplace. Examples of narrow, organized interests achieving their goals at the expense of the broader but unorganized public are quite common. Furthermore, it is usually producer interests, bound together by economic ties, which turn out to dominate less organized consumer groups and groups based upon non-economic interests. The pluralists offer no evidence that political competition can prevent monopoly or oligopoly in political power, any more than economic competition could prevent monopoly or oligopoly in economic power.

Finally, pluralism must contend with the problem of how private non governmental elites can be held accountable to the people. Even if the people can hold governmental elites accountable through elections, how can corporation elites, union leaders, and other kinds of private leadership be held accountable? Pluralism usually dodges this important question by focusing primary attention on public decision making involving governmental elites and by largely ignoring private decision making involving non-governmental elites. Pluralists focus on rules and orders which are enforced by governments, but certainly men's lives are vitally affected by decisions made by private institutions and organizations – corporations, banks, universities, medical associations, newspapers, and so on. In an ideal democracy, individuals would participate in all decisions which significantly affect their lives; but pluralism largely excludes individuals from participation in many vital decisions by claiming that these decisions are "private" in nature and not subject to public accountability.

Peter Bachrach observes:

In keeping with the democratic principle that those who make decisions should be accountable to the people who are affected by them, it was reasonable for theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to think of political as that which involved only government There was little justification to think otherwise, since government was the only organized institution that possessed sufficient decision-making power to affect large groups of people or the active society. To continue to think in the same way today in the face of immense and powerful non-governmental decision making is difficult to understand.

In summary, the plural elite model diverges from classical democratic theory in the following respects:

Decisions are made by elite interaction – bargaining,accommodation, compromise – rather than by direct individual participation.

Key political actors are leaders of institutions and organizationsrather than individual citizens.

Power is fragmented, but inequality of political influence among power holders is common.

Power is distributed among governmental and non-governmental institutions and organizations, but these institutionsand organizations are generally governed by oligarchies, rather than by their members in democratic fashion.

Institutions and organizations divide power and presumably compete among themselves, but there is no certainty that this competitionguarantees political equality or protects individual dignity.

Governmental elitesare presumed to be accountableto the masses through elections, but many important decisions affecting the lives of individuals are made by private elites, who are not directly accountable to the masses.