absolutism

 

A term used to describe monarchic rule which has no limitations. It can be regarded as the ancient form of AUTHORITARIANISM. Hence in Europe it is largely a pre-eighteenth century phenomenon though it lingered in Russia until the early nineteenth. The chief philosophers of absolutism were MACHIAVELLI (1469 1527), Bodin (1530 96) and HOBBES (1588 1679). They were all influenced by their experiences of indecision and civil strife and argued that it was necessary to have a strong monarch who imposed his will on his subjects. Another source of absolutist attitudes was the doctrine of 'legitimacy' which held that the king's right to rule was a consequence of the law of God. Hence some absolutist rulers claimed to have a religious sanction, giving their regime a flavour of theocracy. Some behaved in an arbitrary fashion. Typical absolutist monarchs were Ivan the Terrible (1530 84) of Russia, Ferdinand of Naples (1810 59), known as 'Bomba'.

 

They were opposed to change. When European monarchies became affected by the ENLIGHTENMENT they converted to Enlightened Despotism, a system maintaining monarchic rule, but diluting the authoritarianism with some respect for the law and not only encouraging economic development (which some absolutists like Czar Peter the Great 1672 - 1725 had done), but also promoting the improvement of rights of their subjects. Typical of them was Emperor Joseph II of Austro-Hungary (1780 - 90). Catherine II of Russia (1762 96) flirted with the ideas of the Enlightenment (among other more carnal attachments), but remained an absolutist in action.

 

aristocracy

 

 

	The Greek derivation of this term is the rule of the best people. Plato in his Republic discusses how such men (not women) can be chosen and trained. He called them the 'guardians' and the virtues he required for themlack of corruption, a devotion to the service of the public and integrityare those which might be called 'aristocratic' in the best sense. With ARISTOTLE the term becomes a category of government

 

by the same sort of people, but he gives it a social connotation when he describes the aristocrats as hereditary land-owners. To govern one needs 'a stake in the community'. For Aristotle wealth acquired by commerce is no criteria for responsibility: oligarchy, government by the rich, for him is the corrupt form of aristocracy.

 

	In political writings the Aristotelian usage of the term persisted in some cases until the nineteenth century. Historians and social scientists, however, have used the word to describe a powerful, landed SOCIAL CLASS. In the feudal period a hereditary aristocracy with large estates protected lives and livelihoods of their tenants and serfs with military force and, in return, expected allegiance, labour and, if necessary, service in a private army. The aristocracy received title to their lands from the monarch and were expected to reciprocate with similar favours. Monarchs received their titles from God. Thus revolt could be condemned as heretical. Yet most feudal rebellions were of nobles against kings.

 

	The ENLIGHTENMENT questioned the right of kings and aristocrats to these privileges and, in France, the Revolution swept them away in 1789. In the two centuries since, aristocrats everywhere have seen their political influence decline. Today the term describes a class with hereditary titles and nothing else, though it may be claimed that aristocrats are distinguished by 'breeding' and a sense of 'noblesse oblige'. Quite often, as in Britain, the families of many peers of the realm were only ennobled in the nineteenth century, often for success in commerce or for donating money to the ruling party. To survive, some aristocracies have allied themselves with the military and/or financial and industrial wealth. Often, where they have not done this, aristocrats have become impoverished by taxation imposed by redistributive democratic governments. DEMOCRACY has not been favourably disposed to aristocracy.

 

 

 

authoritarianism

 

Any form of organization or attitude which claims to have the right to impose its values and decisions on recipients who do not have the right or means of responding or reacting freely. With governmental systems it is applied to those that deny democratic freedoms: freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and organization, freedom to oppose the government. Old-fashioned forms of authoritarianism are often described as ABSOLUTISM or DESPOTISM while modern forms may come under the umbrella of TOTALITARIANISM. Another common authoritarian type of government is the MILITARY REGIME

autocracy

Originally this term described an authoritarian regime in which one person ruled without reference to any other source of authority and in an arbitrary fashion. The autocrat does not need to deal with people consistently or fairly. Hence autocracy is typical of primitive societies. Autocratic behaviour can be found in modern societies, but it will not be the distinguishing characteristic. Totalitarian regimes will give plenty of scope for autocrats, but they will have to pay some attention to the framework of regulations. Some democratic politicians will be autocratic in styleone thinks of Charles de Gaulle and Margaret Thatcherbut they will have to operate within the limits of much stricter constitutional restraints

 

Anarchism

 

The term stems from 'anarchy' with a Greek derivation meaning 'no rule' and, therefore, perceived as chaos. Yet anarchists only protest against the rule of the State. They believe society would be better ordered by people controlling themselves. Hence they tend to advocate the superiority of the small community or group. Kropotkin (1842 1921), a Russian anarchist, saw the medieval city as the ideal. Many anarchists are anti-urban and anti-industrial. The commune movement in Europe and America belongs to this tradition. People who 'drop out of the rat race', artists, vegetarians and certain religious groups, for instance, come together to organize a common existence under rules devised by themselves. The Israeli kibbutz could be another example.

 

Other anarchists have been concerned to reorganize productive industry in small units. Proudhon (1809 65) was of this belief. Bakunin (1814 76) was much influenced by Proudhon and his quarrel with MARX over what he saw as the latter's authoritarian tendencies broke up the First International. This type of anarchism found roots in Spain, Italy and France where industrial enterprises remained small and trade unions were organized as local, general bodies. Anarchists have been divided by different approaches to the overthrow of the state, though this has sometimes (not always) been affected by the nature of the state they have confronted. The image of the anarchist as a terrorist with a bomb began in Russia, where an anarchist assassinated Tsar Alexander II in 1881. French anarchists assassinated President Carnot in 1894; and American anarchists killed President McKinley in 1901. On the other hand, many anarchists are pacifists who have contributed to all the peace movements in the twentieth century.

 

 

4.1 Authoritarian regimes

 

About 130 of the world's states can be characterised as authoritarian, that is they claim to have the right to impose their values and policies on their subjects who do not have means to respond freely. There are three broad sub-types.

4.1.1 Absolutist regimes

Absolutist or despotic regimes have usually been a feature of dynastic rule. Hereditary rulers are legitimised by tradition (see Chapter 2). A common belief in Europe until the end of the eighteenth century was that kings had a Divine Right to rule. They were appointed by God. Hence absolutist regimes often have a flavour of theocracy. A religious sanction to rule may cause a ruler to behave in an arbitrary fashion. Law may emanate from his personal decrees or even whims. The reign of Tsar Ivan the Terrible (1530-84) illustrates this tendency. In Russia absolutism lingered on until 1917 with only the slightest concession to democracy in the early years of the century

 

 

Economic development, the opening up of countries to world trade and outside culture, is likely to threaten absolutism. Prime examples of this type of regime were Bahrain, Qatar and the seven smaller Arab Gulf emirates with their traditional ruling families, but the exploitation of oil wealth modernised their economies. The Gulf states' rulers have so far yielded little but their regimes remain unstable.

 

''Modernisation'' is the term applied to the economic and social changes that affect the developing world. It is a portmanteau concept encapsulating industrialisation, secularisation, urbanisation and institutionalisation. Samuel Huntington regards the latter process as the main distinguishing mark between states. ¹ Institutions include legal systems, bureaucracies, police forces and regular armies.

 

4.1.2 Military regimes

These are states where rule is by the armed forces. The navy and air force are sometimes involved, but because they are a territorially based force the army is almost invariably at the centre of military regimes. When Finer wrote about thirty years ago he estimated that over thirty countries in the world were governed in this way. ² There were more military regimes than democracies. Probably there are as many now. Government by soldiers was almost endemic in Central and South America from the time of liberation from Spain in the 1820s. Many of these countries have in recent years established democratic institutions: on the other hand, one can note a growth of military rule in Central and West Africa.

 

As we noted earlier (see Chapter 2), weaponry is an important power resource and where other power resources are slight the military may well be disposed to use their strength. Their disposition to interfere in civil affairs springs from their perception that they are the only institution capable of safeguarding the integrity and sovereignty of their country, and their contempt for civilian politicians whom the generals see as indecisive and incompetent. The army's chain-of-command system with its automatic response to orders seems to them a much more efficient way of taking decisions than by discussion, negotiation and compromise. Opportunities for the military to take over government will obviously arise from war and the threat of war. They are then needed by the politicians. Other opportunities may arise from domestic crises and some countries are racked by almost perpetual crisis. In Latin America and the Middle East military rule is common. Sometimes there is a power vacuum which allows the army to act as it pleases. In primitive states they may be the only institution providing technical training: for example, men can only learn to drive lorries in the army. In countries with highly institutionalised political cultures, such as France and Germany between the wars, the officer class, largely recruited from the aristocracy or haute bourgeoisie, did not regard the civilian government as legitimate.

 

The military often come to power by coups d'état. They occupy all government buldings and the broadcasting stations and usually rule repressively, suppressing civic freedoms and often installing generals at the head of civilian institutions such as universities. In Burma the military not only dominate the economy, they take part in administration. In fairly well developed countries such as Brazil, the generals, when they ruled, could not proceed without the help and consent of business and financial interests who feared the threat of working-class power to economic stability.

 

The military have been responsible for about three-fifths of over 60 instances of the downfall of democracy but there have been many more instances where they have overthrown non-democratic governments. Sometimes one lot of soldiers replaces another: there are factions in the armed forces. Consequently a good deal of military rule has been through committees of generals, the famous 'junta' of South America. Where a single soldier is in power, there is a military dictatorship. Private armies may be the weapon of some dictators. In Haiti where the army was weak, Papa Doc Duvalier, and later his son 'Baby Doc', ruled from 1957 until 1986 with a gang of 5,000 thugs known as the Ton ton Macoute who exerted power by protection rackets and assassination. With the development of more and more lethal weapons armies may become more powerful. Popular insurrection is difficult against tanks. One must conclude that soldiers are not in power everywhere because they do not often want power. Their business is soldiering.

 

4.1.3 Totalitarian regimes

Totalitarianism is a modern form of authoritarianism. It could not exist without modern systems of mass information, communication and control. The term originated with Mussolini (see Chapter 15) and refers to the totality of state control. A totalitarian regime encompasses all human activity. Hence for the individual a completely private social and cultural life is impossible. Civil society does not exist. The main features of totalitarianism are

1. a regime with clearly defined ambitious goals such as conquering the world and/or revolutionising society;

2. a mobilised society supervised, energised, exhorted and instructed by a single party and its activists;

 

3. an official doctrine of admonitory precepts, explanations of the past and prophecies for the future purveyed by the party (see Section Three

 

Totalitarianism was perhaps the main political innovation and leitmotif of the twentieth century. At one time there were about twenty such regimes in the world. Today there are only three China, Cuba and North Korea though others may be qualifying because the mobilising single party is a useful instrument for elitist rulers modernising their developing countries. To date, however, two main types of totalitarian regime have existed. Their goals and doctrines differed though they both ruled through the single party, an idea Mussolini borrowed from Lenin, and Hitler, who admired Mussolini, followed suit. (see Chapter 15). But the goals and doctrines of the regimes are so different that Communist and Fascist parties can hardly behave in the same way. The primary party unit or cell of the Communist parties was intended to spread its message amongst the workers in agriculture and industry as part of the objective of establishing socialism. The units of the Fascist party were essentially platoons of a private army intended to secure compliance by discipline. Hence Fascist regimes are programmed to go into battle

 

	Fascist regimes

 

	As the ideology of Fascism is based upon will (as opposed to reason under Communism), the major value is that of active leadership. Fascist leaders are nothing if not charismatic, legitimating their regimes with their personalities, leadership styles and dramatic performances on the world stage. Individual leadership rules over state, people and party. Mussolini called himself 'Il Duce' and Hitler copied him with 'Der Führer'. Everyone else was supposed to follow them in their intention to initiate a new moral order. This was to be implemented by subordinate hierarchiesstate bureaucracies composed of the old administrators and the new party cadres with control functions that civil officials had never possessed.

 

	These functions were part repressive, quite often arbitrary and part charismatic. The charisma of the leader in the Nazi Party, for example, was transmitted downwards through forty-three Gauleiter (provincial leaders) to Kreisleiter (district leaders) and beneath them Ortsgruppenleiter (local branch leaders). Charisma was transmitted by symbols such as flags, marching songs and exhibiting the leader's photograph at mass rallies. Fascist rule was by a mixed semi-political, semi-military elite skilled and trained in mass domination. In this context mention should be made of the paramilitary formations whose organised intimidation brought the Fascist dictators to power. Mussolini's Squadristi in black shirts were recruited from unemployed ex-servicemen. In the industrial troubles of 1919-22 they broke up strike pickets and set fire to or occupied local socialist committee rooms and newspaper offices. Hitler's Third Reich had two such private armiesthe Stunnabteilung (SA) or brownshirts, formed in the 1920s, and later the Schutzstaffel (ss) or blackshirts, Hitler's own praetorian guard, set up after he quarrelled with the SA leaders. To supplement the functions of these units the state police wielded the weapon of 'state terror'.
All these instruments were used to coordinate the national effort towards the national goal: time was to tell this was victory in war. The economy was guided towards this objective by its structuring in what became known as the 'corporate state' (see Chapter 15).

 

	Communist regimes

 

	These have persisted much longer than Fascist regimes. The Communist model has spread to many countries outside the archetype, the Soviet Union (see Chapter 13 for a brief summary). Lenin designed a new type of party and anchored it on the principle of 'democratic centralism' which envisaged decisions being made at lower levels and proceeding up to the Central Committee and, finally, the Politbureau of the party where collective leadership was practised. Decisions made at the top were binding and were passed down through intermediate levels to the primary party units. Hence dissent within the party was permitted, but party discipline was very important.

 

	Yet Marxism-Leninism, as it became, could only serve as a legitimating ideology for Communist regimes; it was of limited use for building an industrial economy and solving the problems of their society. Lenin died in early 1924 when the revolutionary state was only beginning to deal with them. Stalin, who succeeded to the leadership of the CPSU, by 1936 had collectivised agriculture, vastly increased industrial production in the first Five-Year Plan (1928-1933) and established himself as sole ruler until his death in 1953, using a 'personality cult' to fashion an image of legitimacy. None of the higher institutions of the Party met in this seventeen-year period.

 

	Communist regimes have attempted to improve the material standards of their citizens by giving priority to industrialisation and technological advance. True to the ideology, they have set out to do this without private ownership, entrepreneurial activity or the free forces of the market. Hence the central organisation of the state decides what is to be produced and how it is to be distributed. Communist regimes have central direction of their economy by detailed planning. They have 'command economies'. It is this suspension of market forces and the profit motive which makes the regimes distinctive, not so much public ownership which can be found even in capitalist countries. Production targets are set, often in great detail, for the extent of the Plan (usually about five years), and investment programmes, prices and wages are also fixed. Strikes and normal trade-union activity are forbidden, so wages can be settled at a level low enough to give employment to almost everyone. The temptation is to keep wages stable so that production decisions are simplified and the surplus can be used for investment programmes. Communist regimes build for the distant
future. With wages stable the important factor for ordinary citizens is the level of prices. If they are fixed too low goods will sell out quickly as queues form. If they are fixed too high they stay on the shelves. The authorities may in time react to these citizen responses, but they will not do so quickly because everything has been determined by the Plan. So innovatory policy has to wait until the next Plan.

 

	Hence a command economy may seem a rational way of distributing production, but it is rigid and unadaptable to change. It stifles initiative and does not encourage the introduction of new technology. (The Communist regimes often bought their advanced technology from capitalist countries.) Indeed, as criticism of official policies and procedures is not allowed except at very high levels, a compliant citizenry is almost guaranteed. The political system and economy are not open to change unless it comes from the top. Debate in Communist regimes takes place behind closed doors and at the very highest levels, in Central Committees of a few hundred people or even in Politbureaus of twenty or thirty. The state of the economy is the main topic of discussion. Foreign policy is also important which ensures priority for heavy industry because it is essential to arms production.

 

	Although the Soviet bloc disintegrated in 1989-90 and Communism as a ruling ideology and party disappeared in Eastern Europe it remained in power in the world's largest state, the People's Republic of China (PRC) with a fifth of the world's population. Chinese Communism has exhibited some features which are common to Communism and some which are distinctive. A major difference was that while the Communist Revolution in Russia took at the widest calculation twelve years (1905-17) to arrive, the period of gestation in China was thirtyeight years (1911-49). Further, the main revolutionary instrument for the Chinese Communists was not workers' and soldiers' councils but the People's Liberation Army. The PLA, based in the remote North-west, fought against both the invading Japanese and Chiang Kai Shek's Kuomintang, (a party formed to restore China's greatness), before advancing on Peking in 1949. In consequence army commanders had an importance in China that they never acquired in the Soviet Union.

 

	In its early years, however, the PRC pursued a very similar course to the USSR. Land was first distributed to the peasants and then collectivised in the mid-1950s. The First Five-Year Plan in 1953 was based on the Soviet model with an emphasis on heavy industry. A command economy was established, operating on similar lines to other Communist regimes. By 1957 the Plan was showing some success and industrial output had increased 130 per cent. Collectivised agriculture was based on co-operative farms with about 250 families in each. 4 The Chinese
Communist Party, composed of about 5 per cent of the population, supervised these efforts in the prescribed Leninist way.

 

	Furthermore, the party was modelled on the CPSU although during its years on the periphery of China two different types of party existed. 5 In the Communist 'red-base' area the party chairman was Mao Tse-tung (now transliterated as Mao Zedong) who decried bureaucracy and tried to build the party into one in which the main relationship was between him and 'the masses'. In most of China, where either the Japanese or the Kuomintang ruled, a more Leninist type of structure prevailed in the Communist guerrilla bands, among whom the chief leader was Liu Shao-chi (now Liu Shaoqi). Hence in the Chinese Communist Party the Stalinist and Leninist models of the party were in conflict. Robert Tucker called these respectively the 'führerist' and 'Bolshevik' types of Communist Party.6

 

	From 1949 until Mao's death in 1976 the regime's failures can all be attributed to Mao's success in establishing a Stalinist-type domination over the Communist Party. He was never satisfied with the pace of revolutionary progress and invested his energies in a struggle to accelerate it. In 1956 in an attempt to spur socialist advance, Mao decreed that 'a hundred flowers shall bloom', an invitation to intellectuals to criticise. When this provided no boost to party activity Mao arrested the critics. In 1958 he decreed the 'Great Leap Forward' to expand production. The communes were merged into giant cooperatives of 5,00020,000 families and expected to produce steel in rural furnaces. Industrial production did not appreciably increase and famine in the devastated countryside accounted for 20-30 million deaths. Mao was to blame but by 1965, after a return to a form of collective leadership, he accused Liu and his supporter, Deng Xiaoping, of betraying China. Mao then launched the Cultural Revolution. This was a mobilising of youthful activists, waving little red books containing The Thoughts of Mao, against the bureaucrats of the party and others in high positions. Liu and Deng were imprisoned. The former died in prison, but in 1977, after Mao's death, Deng was released and straightaway began to argue that conflictual politics should give way to economic modernisation. By 1978 Deng had established himself as leader. He decollectivised agriculture, relaxed central planning, introduced the beginnings of a market economy and opened up China to the world. Outcomes were a high rate of inflation, the growth of a black market, corruption among officials and the rise of youthful dissent culminating in the Tiananmen Square massacre in July 1989. Hence in China we have the oddity of the gerontocratic leadership of a Communist Party presiding over a nonCommunist regime. The death of Deng in 1997 does not seem yet to have changed the situation.
The experiences of Stalinism in Russia, Maoism in China and other Communist regimes like North Korea pose the question of whether collective leadership is only a temporary phase in Communist regimes and that reversion to personal dictatorship within them is inevitable. It has been convincingly argued that Lenin is unique among leaders of monolithic ruling parties in that he 'tried to keep the Party organization strong and publicly played down his own role as leader'. 7 He was also unique in only being in power for five troubled years before he died. Otherwise it would seem that Communist regimes must tilt much more towards the 'führerist' pole of organisation and away from the 'Bolshevik'. It is easy to see similarities between the purges of Hitler, Stalin and Mao. The same ruthlessness and treachery were employed against those perceived as potential rivals. Old comrades were not spared. Mao sometimes resembled Mussolini in his comic efforts to exhibit machismo.

 

	The explanation is simple. A totalitarian regime in command of society, the economy and the political system cannot survive for long where there is no one to take responsibility for everything. A chain of command pattern of decision-making requires a commander. In this respect, therefore, Fascist and Communist regimes are similar, if in no other way.

 

	4.4.4 Authoritarian regimes of a mixed kind

 

	Perhaps the largest group of regimes are those that are not absolutist or totalitarian, but which can by no stretch of the imagination be called democratic. Their armed forces are powerful but do not provide the incumbent leadership. There is thus a certain complexity about their social and political arrangements, making them difficult to categorise. There are Asian countries such as Pakistan, South Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan in this bracket, and Latin American countries such as Nicaragua, Colombia, Argentina and Brazil, to name a few.

 

	4.2 Democratic regimes

 

	The intellectual roots of democracy have been attributed especially to Rousseau and the Utilitarians (see Chapter 12). Here we are concerned with the essential features of democratic regimes. These are familiar and easily identifiable. Robert Dahl sums up the distinguishing characteristics of democracy under two rubrics: 'inclusiveness' and 'public contestation'.8 Both are essential to democracy and both were achieved a good deal later than many commentators assume. It is often believed
that democracy in North America and Europe was established by the mid-nineteenth century, but it was not really accomplished until the twentieth.

 

	4.2.1 Distinguishing features of democracy

 

	The principle of inclusiveness implies that all adults should have the equal right to vote in general and local elections and in referendums. They should also have the right to stand as candidates for democratic assemblies and elected office, both at a local and a national level. There should be very few exceptions to inclusiveness. It is usual to exclude certified lunatics and convicted criminals and to have an age limit. There is some variation in the age at which the voting right is reached, though in recent years eighteen has become the norm. It is not uncommon for the age of the right to candidacy to be somewhat higher. In Britain since 1970 one can vote at eighteen, but one cannot stand as a candidate until one is twenty-one. In the USA the 26th Amendment (1971) also extended the franchise to eighteen-year olds, but citizens under thirty are not eligible to be elected to the Senate and those under thirty-five cannot be President.

 

	Thus by the principle of inclusiveness equal participatory rights are given to all democratic citizens. They may not choose to use them. Roughly three-quarters of democratic citizens usually vote in national elections, but the proportion standing as candidates cannot be anything but tiny and perhaps as few as 5 per cent regularly participate in other waysfor example, as activists in pressure groups and political parties.

 

	The principle of public contestation subsumes freedom of self-expression about the political situation in one's country and the right to organise with other citizens. It encapsulates what are often called the 'civic freedoms' or 'civil liberties'.

 

	Freedom of speech allows one to state preferences about policies and to criticise government action. Freedom of the press permits wider dissemination of dissenting views. Freedom of assembly guarantees the right of citizens to gather in groups for all lawful purposes including that of demonstrating and voicing combined opposition to government activities. Freedom of association enlarges freedom of assembly, for it allows temporary combination to become permanent. Hence it safeguards the right to organise, on a nationwide scale if necessary, in order to oppose the government. Thus freedom of association is the basis for pluralism. Of course, organised groups can exist outside a democratic frameworkin medieval society there were churches and guildsbut democracy cannot be complete without pluralism. Pressure
Page 49             groups and political parties are manifestations of pluralism. They are necessary accompaniments of representative democracy (see pp. 12535).                             The principle of governmental accountability is also an essential of democracy. This should ensure that governments are responsive. They should be ready to reply to criticism, even if only to rebut it. It is common for there to be a procedure by which executives answer questions, either formally in legislatures or informally as with American Presidents in presidential press conferences. Democratic governments are also supposed to be responsible. They must be held to account for their actions and if their explanations are unsatisfactory in the eyes of the electorate the latter must be given an opportunity to dismiss them. This is ensured by periodic free and fair elections or by votes denoting lack of confidence which can be held in most legislatures where parliamentary government obtains 9 (see Chapters 7 and 8).                             4.2.2 Democratic decision-making                             Democratic decisions are taken by majorities. If decisions have to be takenand it is hard to see how a modern state can avoid itit would be difficult to take them by minority votes. (If they were taken in this latter Alice-in-Wonderland way, people would vote against the option and/or outcome they wanted.) Majority rules may mean that a 50 per cent + 1 majority of those voting carries the day, or that a 50 per cent + 1 of the electorate is needed to be decisive. At other times, or in other places, a two-thirds or even three-quarters majority may be required. Many democracies will use more than one of these methods.                             There are two main forms of democracydirect democracy and representative democracy.10 Most states have a mixture of them, but representative democracy is the dominant method.                             Direct democracy                             Direct democracy has three components: the recall allowing constituents to force a representative to face re-election or resign; the initiative allowing a proportion of the electorate to present a petition to be put to a referendum, a ballot of the whole electorate. Referendums are widely used in a few democracies, such as Switzerland, and occasionally in most others. Most commonly the occasion is either constitutional amendment or a national decision of historic importance such as whether or not to join the European Union, but in some contexts less grave decisions, such as whether cinemas should open on Sundays, may be referred to the people.                             The alleged advantages of direct democracy are implied criticisms of
representative democracy. For example, it is argued that clarity of issue in a referendum is preferable to the welter of different issues the voter has to deal with in a general election. Referendums are specific. Moreover, issues can be dealt with as they arise: the voters do not have to wait for three or four years until the next election takes place. Therefore, direct democracy has a decisiveness that representative democracy can never have, and it also removes the need for political parties and politicians with their capacity for confusing issues in their desire to attribute all sorts of mistakes to their opponents.

 

	Representative democracy

 

	This is an indirect way of popular participation in decision-making. The voters elect representatives to make decisions for them, thus allowing people more time for other activities. Other advantages are that highly technical decisions, such as those concerned with economic management, are handed over to people experienced at dealing with them. They are discussed in a small chamber in which every legislator can be heard by every other. Moreover, the representatives provide a small core of people from whom political executives can be chosen. The latter present policies which, because of the centralised context, can be interrelated. Agendas can be drawn up and priorities accorded. Policy can be rationalised in programmes.

 

	In consequence representative democracy almost inevitably implies political parties. They are needed to inform electorates, articulate issues and aggregate voters (see Chapter 10). They are needed to select candidates for elections and to provide a government, or to coalesce and share governing with other parties. Critics of parties complain of their complex bureaucratic structures and the way they add to the blurring of contemporary issues in the process of compromise. Their leaders are professional politicians who are sometimes corrupted by power and whose wish to hold on to it by offending as few voters as possible drives them into obfuscation, half-truths and even direct deceit. The clarity and specificity of direct democracy are missing from party-dominated representative democracy.

 

	Objections to representative institutions are many. They clearly interpose a layer between government and people. Representatives are not representative in two senses: they are predominantly middleclass males and their way of life and method of selection through the agency of party (except in the USA where in many states they are chosen by party voters in primary elections) makes them remote from their constituents. Electoral systems can distort public opinion (see Chapter 8). It is also contended that legislatures are in decline because of the increased technicality of policy-making and the growth of
Page 51             technocratic intervention by political bureaucrats who cannot be present in legislatures. (see Chapter 9).                             Yet there is a further complication to representative democracy: the activities of pressure groups who lobby governments in pursuit of ends which are selfish and often highly specific. They are of diverse kinds. Some are concerned with promoting a cause; others like churches are cultural and only concerned with policy when it occasionally impinges on them; others are functional to the state and often walk in the corridors of power, like large-scale business enterprise, trade union movements and armies. Democratic governments are constrained to have relations with them in certain circumstances. For example, in war senior soldiers will need to be consulted. In times of economic crisis, the social partners, business and labour, may become especially important. Democratic governments may often need the knowledge and even expertise of pressure group leaders. Consequently they will be drawn into bargaining with them, an activity outside the framework in which policies are hammered out in executive and legislative committees.                             Stein Rokkan stressed that there were two types of decision-making in every modern democratic state. 11 'Numerical democracy' was the term he applied to the traditional system in which elections determine the balance of party competition, and debate and discussion lead to final decisions being taken in legislatures. Most voters still see this as the decision-making system of their country. For governments making policy by bargaining with pressure groups he coined the term 'corporate pluralism'. (This did not necessarily involve 'corporatism'see pp. 36-7). In this process technocratic civil servants usually participated. Final decisions might be rubber-stamped by legislatures, but there is no access for most legislators, let alone voters, into the process. Consequently democratic accountability is lacking. Moreover, the two systems operate at the same time rendering the decision-making procedures of the modern democratic state highly complex.12                             4.3 Summary                             Clearly these differing regime-types will have very different impacts on their peoples. They produce societies with quite different kinds of social behaviour and political cultures. A visitor does not have to be very observant to note how reluctant citizens of authoritarian states are to say anything about their rulers, while in democracies people can be heard everywhere, and even seen on television, criticising their governments. It is possible to envisage a spectrum of regimes stretching from
totalitarianism to democracy. The degree of civil liberty and voluntary political participation would determine positions on the spectrum.

 

	At one time it was commonly envisaged that democracy was the ideal to which all states should strive. Some nineteenth-century liberals with an optimistic view of progress (see Chapter 12) believed humanity was advancing in that direction anyway. This view was dispelled during the 'era of the dictators' (roughly 1919-89). Today it is again a vision seen by liberals. Political scientists are especially interested in 'regime change': studying the circumstances in which a country moves from authoritarianism to democracy, or vice versa, and then generalising from numerous instances. The cultural and socio-economic factors that bring about such changes are the subject of wide academic debate.