G G G G
Storchevoy M. A. Corporate Social Responsibility. 2013 Topic 3. Where Do Norms Come From?
Optimal Degree of Virtue Grooming Model (4)
may survive in the population of Grudges?
G G G G G G
G G S G G
Only in the large population, where S G G S G G G C there is a low probability that
• Sucker often meets Cheats G G G G G G G G G G G G G G GG G G
• Grudger meets the same Cheats twice G C G G G G G G
G G G G GG G G G G G G G
G G G G S G G
Storchevoy M. A. Corporate Social Responsibility. 2013 Topic 3. Where Do Norms Come From?
Optimal Degree of Virtue Grooming Model (5)
The best strategy for an individual depends on what the majority of the population are doing.
environments (where you may face any combination of various strategies played by your opponent)?
A computer tournament was organized by Robert Axelrod in 1960s for prisoners’ dilemma game. The leading social and game theory professors from world universities were invited to submit their best strategies for this game….
Storchevoy M. A. Corporate Social Responsibility. 2013 Topic 3. Where Do Norms Come From?
Optimal Degree of Virtue
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