Law and Language

First published Thu Dec 5, 2002; substantive revision Mon Aug 9, 2010

Political philosophers are not generally preoccupied with questions in the philosophy of language. But legal philosophers are political philosophers with a specialization that gives language (and philosophy of language) a special fascination.

The use of language is crucial to any legal system — not only in the same way that it is crucial to politics in general, but in the special respect that lawmakers typically use language to make the law, and courts typically use language to state their grounds of decision. So philosophers of law need a good philosophical understanding of the meaning and use of language. But philosophers of law have also tried to draw on insights from philosophy of language to deal with other problems they face. Philosophy of law shares a tension that affects philosophy of mind and metaphysics, and perhaps all the central areas of philosophy: it is often unclear which problems are problems of language, and which are not.

Two areas of philosophical interest in law and language result. First is the interest in the use of language in law. Second is the interest in using philosophy of language to address problems of the nature of law. I will outline some problems in each area. But I will start with a brief historical note on the linguistic preoccupations of legal philosophers.

• 1. Historical note
• 2. The use of language in law
• 2.1 Introduction: Law and signs
• 2.2 Language and Interpretation
• 2.3 Vagueness in language and in law
• 3. The use of philosophy of language in philosophy of law
• 3.1 Introduction: Definition as a methodology in philosophy of law
• 3.2 Language and the normativity of law
• 3.3 The Semantic Sting
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries