Information asymmetryInformation asymmetry deals with the study of decisions in transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. This creates an imbalance in power in transactions which can sometimes cause the transactions to go awry. Examples of this problem are adverse selection (It refers to a market process in which "bad" results occur when buyers and sellers have asymmetric information (i.e. access to different information): the "bad" products or services are more likely to be selected. A bank that sets one price for all its checking account customers runs the risk of being adversely selected against by its low-balance, high-activity (and hence least profitable) customers.) and moral hazard.(a moral hazard is a situation where there is a tendency to take undue risks because the costs are not borne by the party taking the risk. A moral hazard may occur where the behavior of one party may change to the detriment of another after a transaction has taken place. For example, a person with insurance against automobile theft may be less cautious about locking their car, because the negative consequences of vehicle theft are now (partially) the responsibility of the insurance company) A classic paper on adverse selection is George Akerlof's The Market for Lemons.[11] There are two primary solutions to this problem, signalling and screening. For moral hazard, contracting between principal and agent may be describable as a second best solution where payoffs alone are observable with information asymmmetry.[12] [edit] Signaling Michael Spence originally proposed the idea of signaling. He proposed that in a situation with information asymmetry, it is possible for people to signal their type, thus believably transferring information to the other party and resolving the asymmetry. This idea was originally studied in the context of looking for a job. An employer is interested in hiring a new employee who is skilled in learning. Of course, all prospective employees will claim to be skilled at learning, but only they know if they really are. This is an information asymmetry. Spence proposed that going to college can function as a credible signal of an ability to learn. Assuming that people who are skilled in learning can finish college more easily than people who are unskilled, then by attending college the skilled people signal their skill to prospective employers. This is true even if they didn't learn anything in school, and school was there solely as a signal. This works because the action they took (going to school) was easier for people who possessed the skill that they were trying to signal (a capacity for learning).[13] [edit] Screening Joseph E. Stiglitz pioneered the theory of screening (by learning as much as he can)[14] In this way the underinformed party can induce the other party to reveal their information. They can provide a menu of choices in such a way that the choice depends on the private information of the other party.
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